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CO1MENTS
THE POSITION OF THE PRIVATE HOSPITAL IN STATE LAWS
Private hospitals are commonly incorporated under the laws of some state and
are either charitable non-profit or are organized for profit. The title might suggest that this paper is confined to legislation. But for all practical purposes the
judicial decisions affect hospital operation just as much as does legislation, for it
is the courts that interpret the statutory laws.
We will first discuss the private charitable hospital and then the private
hospital organized for profit. There was a time when a non-profit or charitable
institution was exempt from all liability, but that is no longer the general rule.
It seems now to be settled law in some states that the charter itself does n6t
decide the question.' The corporation must not only call itself a charity, but
it must so conduct its business as to be in truth a philanthropic organization.
It is well established, however, that if a corporation is essentially a charitable
one, the mere fact that a certain department, for example, the X-ray laboratory,
earns a profit does not affect the general character of the institution. 2 Furthermore, the department showing a profit is not to be considered apart from the
hospital itself in determining its status. The courts are questioning more and
more the granting of immunity from liability for damages solely on the basis
of the form of incorporation. Proof that the organization is charitable in fact
as well as in name is being demanded.3 Courts have shown less generosity in
granting immunity and are finding ways and means to achieve their end. One
case bears mention here. Catherine Sheehan had been a paying patient in the
North County Community Hospital, a charitable corporation. While she was
being removed in its ambulance to her home, negligence of the driver brought
the ambulance into collision with another vehicle and the plaintiff suffered
injuries. On these facts there was squarely presented for the first time in the
New York Court of Appeals the question whether a charitable institution,
not of itself in default in the performance of any non-delegable duty, should
be declared exempt from liability to a beneficiary for personal harm caused
by the negligence of one acting as its mere servant or employee. The court
held the defendant was not exempt and submitted the question of negligence
to the jury who returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.4 There is ample
This article is a synopsis of a paper read before the Catholic Hospital Association of the
United States and Canada, June 13, 1939, at Milwaukee, Wis. Acknowledgement Is made
to the Catholic Hospital Association for kind permission to publish this synopsis.
1. England v. Hospital of Good Samaritan, 16 Cal. App. (2d) 640, 61 P. (2d) 48 (1936).
2. Ritchie v. Long Beach Community Hospital, 139 Cal. App. 688, 34 P. (2d) 771
(1934); Silva v. Providence Hospital, 87 P. (2d) 374 (Cal. App. 1939).
3. McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876); Collins v. Post Graduate
Medical School, 59 App. Div. 63, 69 N. Y. Supp. 106 (2d Dep't 1901); Hamilton v.
Corvallis Hospital, 146 Ore. 167, 30 P. (2d) 9 (1934).
4. Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N. Y. 163, 7 N. E. (2d) 28
(1937); id., 273 N. Y. 580, 7 N. E. (2d) 701 (1937); cf. Schloendorff v. Society of N. Y.
Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914).
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reason to believe that the future will bring more encroachments on the rule
of exemption and that other courts will be influenced by this decision.
It is not surprising that there is a great diversity of opinion and ruling
among the various courts of last resort. Their decisions might be classed into
three general groups: one, which holds the charitable hospital just as liable
as any other corporation or individual, another which holds the hospital immune
from all liability for the injurious acts of its servants or employee3, and a
third, which avoids the two extremes and in which most of the states concur,
imposes liability or grants immunity under certain circumstances. General
opinion against hospitals is gaining momentum. The view that modem conditions do not justify that hospitals receive special legal exemption, is increasing.
In fact, in this era, the whole social and political structure is undergoing a
change. One law always necessitates another so that legislation is so voluminous and scattered that the actual or potential menace of each cannot be
estimated.
Now what is the liability for injuries to a paying patient? There is a growing minority of jurisdictions which holds the hospital liable for negligence of
its nurses resulting in injury or death of a paying patient, notwithstanding
that hospitals are organized as charity and give charitable services.5 There
was a time when such institutions were few and needed encouragement, but these
courts of last resort say that it is no longer necessary to protect such institutions against individuals who are injured. In this, Georgia is not as severe
as some of the other states. It limits liability only to the extent of funds
received from paying patients or other sources not charitable. 6 What merits
particular attention is the growing feeling that the individual needs the protection of the law more than institutions.
Concerning liability for negligence of servants, the majority of states still
holds that a private hospital operated as a charity is not liable for negligence
of employees unless it failed to use due care in the selection or retention of
servants who caused the injury.7 The burden of proof is on the plaintiff.8
The trust fund theory, implied waiver theory, or public policy theory of
immunity is usually given as a reason for exemption. One court said "a hospital undertakes not to heal or attempt to heal through the agency of others,
5. Budge Memorial Hospital v. Maughan, 79 Utah 516, 3 P. (2d) 25S (1931); Getzhoffen v. Sisters of Holy Cross, 32 Utah 46, 88 Pac. 691 (1907); cf. Ssalons v. De
Memorial Hospital, 94 Utah 460, 78 P. (2d) 645 (1938); Zeidler v. Sisters of the Sorrowful
Mother, 1S3 Okla. 454, 82 P. (2d) 996 (1938).
6. Robertson v. Baptist Convention, 190 S. E. 432 (Ga. 1937).
7. Stine v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 196 Ind. 350, 144 N. E. 537, Note 33 A. L. R. 1361
(1924); Roosen v. Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 126 N. E. 392 (1920); Taylor v.
Flower Deaconess Home, 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N. E. 2S7 (1922); Barncs v. Providence
Sanitarium, 229 S. W. 5S8 (Tea. Civ. App. 1921); Williamson v. St. Paul's Sanitarium,
164 S. W. 36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914); Moore v. Baptist Hospital, 156 Miss. 676, 126 So. 465
(1930); Hendrickson v. Hodkin, 276 N. Y. 252, 11 N. E. (2d) 899 (1937).
8. Waddell v. Y.M.CA., 133 Ohio St. 601, 15 N. E. (2d) 140 (1938); Hartley v.
Randall Hospital, 24 Wyo. 408, 160 Pac. 385 (1916).
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but merely to supply others who will heal or attempt to heal on their own
responsibility."9 Some hospitals are seeking protection by carrying liability
insurance. Legally, it has not affected the hospital's standing in court. Courts
have generally held that the fact of insurance is immaterial; that it will not
of itself impose liability upon a charitable organization if no liability exists
under the laws of the state.10
The last few years have seen a remarkable increase in the number of reported decisions involving hospitals not only in the United States but also in
Canada. The difficult problem concerning the liability of a hospital for the
negligence of its trained nurses was extensively discussed in the recent Canadian
case of Fleming v. Sisters of St. Joseph." The Supreme Court of Canada held
the defendant hospital liable for the negligence of one of its nurses who had
severely burned the plaintiff during a diathermic treatment. The court held
that the duty of the hospital was not limited in supplying competent nurses;
the hospital having undertaken to provide certain treatment, there was no
reason to exonerate it for the negligent acts of persons who were in its employ
and subject to its control.
There are numerous American cases on this point. One bears explanation
in detail. It is the Minnesota case often quoted. 12 Lawrence Grotte had been
admitted to the defendant's hospital as a pneumonia patient. He became
delirious and during the absence of attendants, jumped from the second story
window of his room. Death resulted. It was shown that the attendants knew
of patient's delirium for some forty hours before his death. The attending
nurse left the window slightly open and was absent from the room for about
five minutes. The court held that the evidence of negligence was sufficient and
that liability should be imposed even though the defendant was operating a
charitable hospital. In the words of the learned judge:
"We do not believe that a policy of irresponsibility best subserves the beneficent purpose for which the hospital is maintained. We do not approve the public policy, which would require the widow and children of deceased, rather than
the corporation, to suffer the loss incurred through the fault of the corporation's
employees, or, in other words, which would compel the persons damaged to
contribute the amount of their loss to the purposes of even the most worthy
corporation. We are of the opinion that public policy does not favor exemption from liability."' 3
Plaintiff recovered judgment in the sum of $6500.
This leads to another question. Is the nurse an agent and servant of the
physician or of the hospital? Some duties of a nurse are routine matters for
the benefit of the hospital, others are under the direct control of the attending
physician. Even in the operating room there may be acts which the hospital
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 170, 160 N. W. 173, 174 (1916).
Moore v. Baptist Hospital, 156 Miss. 676, 126 So. 465 (1930).
2 D. L. R. 417 (1938). See discussion in (1938) III CmAwwr L. RFP. 172.
Mullin v. Evangeliches Diakoniessenverein, 144 Minn. 372 (1920).
Id. at 376.
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may control. Under which category a nurse's particular act will fall is a question of fact to be determined in each individual case. Some courts hold that
it is the duty of the physician, in using the nurses furnished by the hospital,
to see that every act necessary for the operation is properly performed. Under
such circumstances the nurse is the servant of the operating surgeonY14
There are conflicting decisions as to the liability of a charitable hospital
for injuries to employees, visitors, servants, or strangers. In one case the
plaintiff employee was injured as a result of her hand being caught in a defective ironing machine, but the court held the hospital exempt because it was
a charitable institution.'1 In another case the plaintiff was a student nurse
and was assigned to a contagious case but was not so informed. The patient
developed diphtheria and the plaintiff contracted it also. The court held that
the defendant was negligent and that it was an adopted rule in that state
(New Hampshire) that charitable hospitals were not to be held exempt from
the consequences of their negligent acts, but that they are to be treated as
individuals and other corporations. 16 As to visitors, it is the general view that
there was sufficient proof that the hospital
there could be no recovery unless
17
failed to exercise ordinary care.
Louisiana has made an inroad on the doctrine of exemption from liability.
A plaintiff was injured by a truck owned by the defendant hospital. The court
held that he was not a beneficiary and that he could recover because all persons
and corporations must answer for the consequences of their negligent acts.1 8
Another court stressed this point:
"Where innocent persons suffer through their fault, they should not be exempted.
.. .It is almost contrary to hold that an institution organized to dispense
charity shall be charitable and extend aid to others, but shall not compensate
or aid those injured by it in carrying on its activities?' 0
Now let us dwell on the liability of the private profit hospital. The laws
of the various states agree that private hospitals organized for profit have
approximately the same responsibility as other corporations or individuals.
Private institutions are obliged by express or implied contract to render reasonable care and attention to their patients for their safety, as their mental and
14. Emerson v. Chapman, 138 Okla. 270, 280 Pac. 820 (1929). It is a rule in Oklahoma
that the operating surgeon and not the hospital is responsible for the nurses. Hart v.
Flower Hospital, 178 Okla. 447, 62 P. (2d) 1248 (1936).
15. Whittaker v. St. Luke Hospital, 137 Mo. App. 116, 117 S. W. 1189 (1903). Accord:
Emery v. Jewish Hospital Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S. W. 577 (1921).

16. Hewitt v. Woman's Hospital Aid Ass'n, 73 N. H. 556, 64 Atl. 190 (1906).

Accord:

Murtha v. Flower Hospital, 228 N. Y. 183, 126 N. E. 722 (1920). Note: an interne is
an employee of the hospital within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Bernstein v. Beth Israel Hospital, 236 N. Y. 268, 140 N. E. 694 (1923).
17. Daniel v. Jackson Infirmary, 173 Miss. 832, 163 So. 447 (1935); Bonawitt v. Sisters
of Charity, 43 Ohio App. 347, 182 N. E. 661 (1932).

18. Bougon v. Volunteers of America, 151 So. 797 (La. 1934).
19. Geiger v. Simpson Ml. E. Church, 174 Minn. 389, 395, 219 N. W. 463, 465 (1928).
Accord: Murtha v. Flower Hospital, 228 N. Y. 183, 126 N. E. 722 (1920).
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physical condition, if known, may require. Private hospitals, conducted for
gain, have been held liable for the negligent and careless acts of nurses and
other employees. The master is responsible for the acts of his servants, if they
are within the scope of his employment. 20 For instance, a patient sustained a
severe shock when an electric fan flew to pieces in her room. The fright,
caused by ordinary negligence, resulted in physical injury to the patient. The
court declared the hospital liable. 21
The much appealed and much discussed case of Hendrickson v. Hodkin
merits our attention. At the first trial the question of importance was the
liability for negligence of the physician. All three defendants, the hospital,
physician, and nurse, were held responsible. But only the hospital appealed
and on this appeal the complaint was dismissed because, as the court said:
"The rule is now well settled that a hospital, whether charitable or private,
is immune from liability to patients by reason of the negligence of its doctors
22
with respect to any matter relating to the patient's medical care and attention. "
At the second trial, the important question was the liability of a private institution for permitting treatment by a non-medical practitioner. The court held
"private non-charitable hospital corporations operated for profit are liable for
the torts of their executive officers committed within the general scope of
their authority."23 Further that:
"In the case at bar the basis of liability is not the negligence of the doctor or
nurse in charge, but the wrongful conduct of the executive manager and superintendent acting within the scope of his authority in offering for pay the use
of the hospital and its facilities for the purpose of commission of acts24which
constitute a tort, and a crime in violation of a duty owed a patient.1
Noting a few of the facts, we find that the defendant corporation permitted
for several weeks, a non-medical practitioner the use of hospital facilities to
carry on his treatment. He held himself out as having a cancer cure which
in fact injured the plaintiff to such an extent that after a few weeks no lip
or chin remained and his teeth fell out. The manager and superintendent had
the right and even the obligation to refuse facilities to one not authorized to
practice medicine under the state laws, and since they did not exercise reasonable care for the safety of this patient, they were held responsible.
Charitable hospitals have been granted certain exemptions in order to foster
and encourage them. But when a hospital, no matter what the legal status,
20. Meridian Sanitorium v. Scruggs, 121 Miss. 330, 83 So. 532 (1920); Green v. Blggs,
167 N. C. 417, 83 S. E. 553 (1914) ; Fawcett v. Ryder, 23 N. D. 20, 135 N. W. 800 (1912);
Duke Sanitarium v. Hearn, 159 Okla. 1, 13 P. (2d) 183 (1932).
21. Garner v. Newman Hospital, 58 Ga. App. 104, 198 S. E. 122 (1938).
22. 250 App. Div. 619, 620, 294 N. Y. Supp. 982, 983 (2d Dep't 1937), discussed In
(1938) 22 Mn-x. L. Rav. 283.
23. Hendrickson v. Hodkin, 276 N. Y. 252, 11 N. E. (2d) 899 (1937), rev'g 250 App.
Div. 619, 294 N. Y. Supp. 982 (2d Dep't 1937).
24. Id. at 258, 11 N. E. (2d) 899 at 902.
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enters into a legal contract to perform certain acts, such an agreement the
courts will enforce. The hospital's liability for breach of a contract is the
25
same as any other private corporation or person
Of growing interest are hospital lien laws. They are passed to protect hospitals, physicians and nurses. They usually give an institution or person the
right to interpose a claim for services rendered to an injured person. Hospital
lien laws differ in some detail in the various states.203 The variations make an
interesting study. Some lien laws cover only charitable institutions, others,
those supported in whole or in part by public funds. Rarely, however, is the
small doctor-owned or private hospital given this protection. Some lien laws
give priority to the attorney; some limit reimbursement to 50% of the sum
recovered, others to $200; others permit the so-called ward rates, some $50
to all physicians and $50 to all nurses. Nevertheless, most of the states provide
full remuneration for reasonable services and accommodations. The laws differ
in various other details. Liens must be filed within five days, others within
ten days and still others, twenty days. Some require suits to enforce liens
within one year, others two years, still others the usual statute of limitations
applies. Filing fees range from 12¢ to $1.00. Some states"7 have no lien laws
but the hospitals have agreements with insurance companies which work
satisfactorily.
Most of the thirty-one states which have as yet no hospital lien laws have
made an effort in the last few years to seek that protection. The number of
the bills and a description of them are detailed, state for state, in the report
of which this paper is a synopsis.2 A study of the several lien laws and how
20
they are enforced is recommended.
The hospital is always a community enterprise; whether public or private,
profit or charitable, it needs the support and faith of the community and of
members of the legal profession in particular. The absence of any specific
regulation and control in the statutes of many states indicates not the absence
25. Roche v. St. John's Riverside Hospital, 96 Misc. 289, 160 N. Y. Supp. 401 (Sup.
CL 1916); see Loewinthen v. Beth David Hospital, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 367, 371 (Sup. Ct.

1938).
26. In general, these statutes give hospitals liens on the right of action of any patient
receiving treatment on account of personal injuries incurred as a result of some third
person's negligence prior to admission to the hospital. See Iowa, CoDe (1935) § 10437;
IxD. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 43-501; Mm-n. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1934) § 8556-3;
MoNT. Rv. CoD Aax. (Anderson and McFarland, 193S) § 8395-1; N. D. LAws (1935)
217; N. J. LAWS (1935) 759; N. Y. L=N LAw (1939) § 189; OM. COD A-----. (Supp.
1935) § 51-1501; T= STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1934) art. 5506a; VA. Cove (Michie, 1936)
§ 1560(1). Another type of statute restricts a hospital's lien to the patient's accident and
liability insurance policy. See CoNN. GE.. STAT. (1930) § 5139. For a further discussIon
of hospital lien laws, see (1937) 37 CoL. L. Rav. 1036 and Comment (1937) 12 WSH
L. REv. 295.
27. Massachusetts and Wisconsin.
28. Sister M. Ann Joachim, The Position of the Privatc Hospital in State Llics (1939)
Hosp rrA. PROrmSS 274-283.
29. Note 26, supra.
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of power but rather a satisfaction on the part of the legislatures that hospitals
are being ,carefully and properly managed and that there is no need for state
regulation. The hospitals themselves, by organizing into associations and by
grading the hospitals according to set standards, have regulated themselves and
raised the standard of quality and service far more than any legislative act
could possibly do.
SISTER M. ANN JOACHIM, O.P.t

THE EFFECT OF MECHANIC'S LIENS ON THE REVERSIONARY
INTEREST OF LANDLORDS*
The improvement of leased real property at the instance of a tenant frequently
gives rise to knotty problems involving the liability for the cost of repairs.
The unpaid contractor receives certain rights in the realty in addition to his
right to a money judgment against the tenant for the cost of the work and
materials. Under the various forms of mechanic's lien statutes in effect in
this country, the contractor is given the right to file a lien against the tenant's
interest in the property, and, under proper circumstances, against the reversionary
interest of the landlord as well. The tenant who orders the work is clearly
bound. Passing this question of contractual liability, the advent of mechanic's
liens as supplementary protection for the contractor making repairs on leased
property presents several vexatious problems. Shall the landlord who is a
step removed from the contractor also be bound? It is his land which is
improved. If the tenant in ordering the work is complying with his lessor's
prescription, it is clear that the reversionary interest is bound under all types
of statutes herein discussed, despite their differences in form. But suppose the
landlord has not sought the improvement. Is he to be improved out of his
freehold? The improvement may not, in his eyes, improve. It may be
singularly inappropriate-an idiosyncrasy of the tenant. It may be a unique
structure or a specialty building designed for the particular use of the tenant
and of no functional utility otherwise. A ducal chateau erected in a slum
district adds no value to the land. It depresses the value by the cost of its
removal.
It should be borne in mind in these cases that the tenant ordering the work
is liable to the contractor in personam for the cost, and that his leasehold
interest may be bound in rem by the lien. The landlord, consenting to or
acquiring the work, is never liable in personamr for the cost unless he has agreed
to contribute thereto.' This distinction may not be of importance if the
owner's equity is substantial, for as a practical matter, he will not permit its
foreclosure. Today, however, the average property, through depression of
t

Admitted to practice before United States Supreme Court.

*Acknowledgement is made to Milton R. Friedman of the New York Bar for helpful
suggestions in the preparation of this paper.
1. Weinheimer v. Hutzler, 234 App. Div. 566, 256 N. Y. Supp. 7 (4th Dep't 1932):
see Brigham v. Young, 241 N. Y. 435, 439, 150 N. E. 207, 208 (1926).

